Western Hegemony in Danger: British Analysis Explains How Sana’a Forces Defeated the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea
NYN | Reports and analyses
An analytical article published on the British news site “UnHerd” asserts that the Houthis (Sana’a government forces) have established control over the Red Sea after defeating the U.S. Navy and forcing it to retreat. The article suggests that the media silence surrounding this defeat reflects a growing sense of embarrassment, emphasizing that the failure is not due to a lack of will on the part of the United States, but rather its inability to stop the Houthis’ attacks, who are supporting Gaza.
The article highlights the U.S. military’s efforts to counter the Houthis, beginning with Operation “Guardian of Prosperity” and then “Poseidon Archer,” both of which proved ineffective. Despite American attempts to precisely target the weapons used by the Houthis, modern technologies like drones and missiles have rendered these efforts futile, underscoring the growing inability of the U.S. military to handle modern threats.
The article also notes that drones, which are relatively inexpensive compared to interceptor missiles and precision-guided bombs, are increasing the financial burden on the United States. It discusses how the American military strategy, which relies on practices from World War II, has become unsuitable in the age of advanced technology. The article further points out a crisis within Western military organization, suggesting that Western hegemony may be nearing its end as media reports overlook the military failure, complicating the ability to address the complex reality of the conflict in the Red Sea.
The analytical article, titled “The Houthis Now Control the Red Sea, and America Has Quietly Admitted Defeat,” was written by British writer Malcolm Keown, who is based in Sweden. It states: “If you have followed the news recently, you might be excused for thinking that the blockade in the Red Sea imposed by the Houthis in Yemen has been defeated. In recent months, we have heard little from foreign policy experts on the matter. Does this mean the issue has been resolved? Not quite.”
In this context, the article points out that “today, the blockade is stronger than ever, and the U.S. military has given up on trying to lift it. Two weeks ago, the Houthis managed to board a Greek-flagged oil tanker, plant explosives, and chant ‘Death to America! Death to Israel!’ as the ship caught fire. Last week, the Pentagon quietly acknowledged that the tanker is still burning.”
Commenting on these developments, the article stresses that “this should be major news, as one of the world’s most important trade routes is now closed by a group of militants, and the U.S. Navy has raised its hands in defeat and sailed away. Yet, there is a media blackout on the subject.”
The article highlights that “the reason for ignoring the crisis might be relatively simple: beyond sharing an increasing sense of embarrassment, we no longer know how to talk about what is happening. After all, the U.S. Navy is supposed to be the strongest in the world. As every war movie in the past two decades has insisted on reminding us, all it takes is one aircraft carrier to force a developing nation into submission. America may not excel at ‘nation-building,’ but what an ability to bomb things until all resistance stops.”
The article continues: “Yemen is where these narratives collide with reality. Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq, attempts to lift the blockade on the Suez Canal do not represent the type of ‘optional wars’ we can simply walk away from when we grow tired.”
The article adds: “If the blockade continues, it will mean at least two things. First, the entire world will receive dramatic proof of the increasing military and political impotence of the West, which will have real consequences for Western diplomacy in regions like the Pacific.”
“Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Suez Canal is one of the world’s most critical trade routes, and forcing container ships to detour around it will manifest in supply crises and structural price increases, especially for European economies. Europe is already facing slow growth and an energy crisis; a blockade of a major trade route is the last thing we need.”
The article notes that “this is precisely what has happened, and this time, it is clear that the United States does not know what to do. In December of last year, the U.S. Navy and Central Command first launched Operation ‘Guardian of Prosperity,’ aimed at protecting shipping from Houthi missile attacks.”
Following the events, the article explains: “In January, when this mission began to falter, Operation ‘Poseidon Archer’ was launched, designed to bomb the Houthis into submission and deter them from launching further attacks on trade. The result was highly unsatisfactory: after months, the Yemeni death toll ‘at least’ reached 22, while the U.S. lost several expensive MQ-9 drones to Houthi anti-aircraft missiles and two elite naval personnel who drowned while attempting to intercept a shipment of missile components bound for Yemen.”
In analyzing this situation, the article states: “At first glance, the low casualty count might suggest a lack of American resolve; many argue that the problem is that the U.S. is merely toying with soft gloves. But this is not the case. The United States has tried, to the best of its ability, to precisely identify and target Houthi weapons and launch sites within Yemen, but there is one problem: it cannot.”
The article adds: “In the age of drone warfare, mobile launch platforms, and advanced tunnel infrastructure, the U.S. simply lacks the capability to detect and destroy most drones or missiles before they are launched. This problem is not entirely new either: ‘Scud hunting’ was challenging enough during the first Gulf War, and Scud launchers were massive, outdated things. Today, with new drone and missile technology, finding a drone launch platform within a mountain range is like looking for a needle in a haystack.”
On the other hand, the article explains: “There is also a more obvious problem: drones are cheap, while U.S. interceptor missiles and precision-guided bombs are incredibly expensive. Additionally, the method of delivering these bombs—manned fighter jets—adds another layer of expense, as fighters can cost more than $100 million to operate, and much more when accounting for pilot training (at least $10 million for basic proficiency), maintenance, and infrastructure.”
The article adds: “In other words, the more America fights the Houthis, the more it loses. This strategy is based on what might be called an updated approach to World War II-era practices. Today, aircraft are faster, aircraft carriers are larger and nuclear-powered, and destroyers are equipped with missiles instead of guns—but the logic behind deploying them remains entirely rooted in the past.”
The article continues: “The use of manned aircraft for long-range bombing was central because there was no alternative; if you wanted a large ball of explosives to land precisely from the sky, there had to be a human there to guide it. That is, of course, no longer the case, yet a combination of prestige, complacency, and the absence of a functional industrial base is rendering the U.S. military increasingly irrelevant.”
In conclusion, the article highlights the outcome of the current situation in the Red Sea: “If the U.S. Navy cannot even lift a blockade from Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the world, the idea of lifting a blockade around Taiwan is pure fantasy.”
The article adds: “If the U.S. cannot compete with Iranian arms production, the notion of outpacing China should be immediately forgotten.”
The article also points out: “But this is also why the Red Sea defeat will be met with silence. More than any other ongoing conflict today, it highlights the crisis within Western military organization and the fact that there is no real way to fix it.”
The article concludes that “acknowledging our impotence means admitting that the era of Western hegemony is truly over. Faced with few alternatives, we will continue to allow the Houthis to blow up our ships—and then pretend it doesn’t really matter.”