“The Hill”: Failure to Control the Red Sea Marks the Biggest Setback for the U.S. Navy in 50 Years, Threatens Global Trade
NYN | Reports and analyses
The U.S. newspaper The Hill reported that the failure to deter Sanaa government forces and regain control of the Red Sea represents the most significant existential setback for the U.S. Navy in 50 years, threatening the stability of U.S. maritime trade, which is valued at trillions of dollars.
In an analytical article by writer Steve Cohen, it was noted that “the U.S. Navy has suffered its greatest setback in the past 50 years over the past few months—a disaster more devastating than the sinking of the Bonhomme Richard or the loss of 17 sailors in two destroyer collisions.”
Cohen added, “This is an existential setback that raises questions about the very reason for the Navy’s existence. It appears that the Navy is abandoning its primary mission of keeping vital maritime routes open for trade. After a nine-month deployment to regain control of the Red Sea from the Houthis in Yemen, the Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier group returned to the U.S. without displacing the Houthis.”
He pointed out that “shipping accounts for $5.4 trillion of U.S. annual trade and supports 31 million American jobs.” He added that “cargo ships have rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, adding over 11,000 miles, one to two weeks per trip, and an additional $1 million in fuel costs per voyage. Insurance premiums have also risen by 1000%, and a container that once cost $1,500 to ship now costs $6,000.”
Cohen explained that “keeping sea lanes open has been a core justification for the Navy since the founding of the republic, with the Navy established to protect commercial shipping. As John F. Kennedy once said: ‘The U.S. must control the sea if we wish to protect our security.'”
However, “when the Eisenhower strike group returned to Norfolk last month, there was no banner declaring the mission accomplished. Instead, the Navy issued a message that, at best, was less than inspiring, boasting that this deployment was unprecedented. Not only was it unusually long, but it was also the first time since World War II that a U.S. aircraft carrier faced continuous direct threat from an enemy,” the article mentioned.
The report also noted that “U.S. ships fired 155 Standard-2 missiles at Houthi drones, 135 Tomahawk missiles at land targets, and naval aircraft launched nearly 60 air-to-air missiles and 420 air-to-ground weapons.”
Nevertheless, according to the article, “the mission failed.” Cohen emphasized that “the Houthis still control the Red Sea, and despite all the efforts, dedication, and skill shown by the sailors and aircrews, it was insufficient to achieve the mission.”
Cohen suggested two possible reasons for this failure: “First, the U.S. Navy either lacks the means and expertise to address the situation, or second, the Biden administration concluded that the cost, risk, or strategic value of achieving the mission is not worth the political effort. But whatever the reason, the failure undermines one of the key reasons for maintaining an expensive Navy.”
He proposed three ways to address the issue of continued Houthi control. First, the Navy must acknowledge that the tools it has been using are largely inappropriate for the problem. Each Tomahawk and Standard-2 missile costs at least $2 million, while targeting a $2,000 drone. Even with the lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war on drone usage, the Navy has not adapted quickly enough to equip its ships for this new asymmetric reality.
Second, the Navy should avoid measuring success by inputs—ammunition fired—rather than outcomes, a mindset reminiscent of the Vietnam War era. Instead, success should be measured by the results achieved.
Third, political leaders must be transparent about sending an inadequately equipped naval force on an undefined mission and take responsibility for it.
Cohen concluded by saying, “We are now in the midst of a close electoral race, and it is unlikely that any candidate will admit that we lack the resources (or political will) to regain control of this vital sea route. But until then, we should not send our young men and women into danger without the proper equipment to do the job and complete a well-defined mission.”