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By Reem Hani
Tony Blair’s record reveals the contradictions of a leader who waged devastating wars and is now being presented as a “peace” mediator for Gaza under Trump’s plan, which is explicitly tailored to serve Israel’s interests.
Tony Blair—the “champion” of Donald Trump’s latest plan to end the war in Gaza—came to power in 1997 as the leader of the British Labour Party.
At the time, he stated that his ambition was to be part of “the first generation that can think of living our entire lives without going to war or sending our children to war.”
However, by the end of his decade-long tenure, after being elected for two terms, Blair had sent British troops into combat more than any other British prime minister since World War II. He was unafraid to engage in controversial domestic and international conflicts—even when his decisions were unpopular—according to a report by Time magazine.
In 1998, the UK and the US launched a four-day bombing campaign against then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime over “weapons inspections.”
In 1999, the UK took part in NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. Then, in 2000, Blair sent British troops to support the government of Sierra Leone during its civil war. In 2001, he joined the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks.
However, the most defining moment of Blair’s time in office—now 72 years old—was his decision to lead the UK into the 2003 Iraq war alongside the United States, based on false claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
According to a 2017 report by the BBC summarizing Blair’s legacy, he “exhausted every ounce of his skill” to convince MPs and the broader public of the need to join the U.S.-led invasion.
In 2009, a public inquiry led by civil servant Sir John Chilcot concluded in 2016 that Blair had no “satisfactory legal basis” for launching the war.
As a result, Blair faced a private lawsuit accusing him of war crimes, which the UK Supreme Court dismissed in 2017.
Observers believe Blair’s support for the invasion, without any regard for “his own government’s future,” marked the beginning of his political decline. His resignation as prime minister in 2007 became inevitable when it became clear he could no longer win a general election.
As for Palestine specifically, after resigning in 2007 amid collapsing popularity, Blair became the Middle East envoy for the “Quartet” (UN, U.S., EU, and Russia).
According to the Quartet’s website, its mission was to support “the Palestinian people in building institutions and a viable, peaceful state in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.”
Simultaneously, Blair established his consultancy firm, Tony Blair Associates, offering economic and governance reform advice. He also joined JPMorgan Chase as a senior adviser, according to Time.
It is unsurprising that critics argue Trump’s plan will add another “failure” to Blair’s record.
Observers note that while Blair oversaw Palestinian economic development during his envoy tenure, he failed to stop settler violence or illegal settlement expansion.
He was also criticized for failing to push toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, with accusations of a conflict of interest between his diplomatic and commercial roles.
For instance, British journalist Jonathan Cook, who focuses on Israeli–Palestinian relations, wrote in The Journal of Palestine Studies (2013) that Blair had “few achievements to show” for his time as Quartet envoy, but liked to boast about one particular success: his 2009 negotiation with Israel for radio frequencies that allowed for the creation of a second Palestinian mobile operator, Wataniya Mobile, in the West Bank.
However, according to Cook, the deal benefited JPMorgan, which had loaned money to Wataniya’s parent company, and came at “a high political cost to the Palestinians.” In exchange for releasing the frequencies, Israel demanded that Palestinian leaders drop their efforts at the UN to present evidence of Israeli war crimes committed during Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009).
Given all this, it is unsurprising that many observers—both in the West and Palestine—believe Trump’s latest plan is just another “failure” to be added to Blair’s Middle East record. They argue that the plan’s real purpose may be to “defuse” global outrage over Israel’s genocide in Gaza while allowing Netanyahu’s government to continue its war.
In this context, The Wall Street Journal reported that after nearly two exhausting years of war, Netanyahu finally agreed to terms for ending the conflict that would benefit his political future. Much of this is due to the fact that “the hard work of persuading Hamas to comply with Trump’s 20-point plan to end the fighting in Gaza will fall to Israel’s Arab neighbors. As long as they fail to deliver, Netanyahu is in a better position to fend off further international condemnation if the fighting continues.” The report adds that “little is likely to change for Palestinians on the ground.”
Meanwhile, The Guardian published a report noting that the plan ties Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to the pace of disarmament and stripping Hamas of its capabilities—a clear benefit for Israel, given that the territories it may withdraw from have already been destroyed by continuous attacks. A “slow withdrawal” would cost Israel next to nothing.
With the proposed maps still vague and no firm commitment to a Palestinian state, the plan falls far short of Hamas’s demands in recent negotiations.
Both Netanyahu and Trump emphasized that “if things don’t go their way” and Arab states fail to pressure Hamas into accepting the plan, the Israeli army will resume operations with “full support from the United States.”
Even if hostages are handed over within 72 hours of the agreement’s implementation, “nothing guarantees that Israel will keep its promises,” as demonstrated in March, when it reneged on its commitment to move to the second phase of the ceasefire—which could have led to ending the conflict—according to the same source.
Moreover, while the idea of reviving regional normalization and building on the “Abraham Accords” may seem attractive, the past two years have shown that this issue holds little real weight in Israeli decision-making.
The author is a Lebanese journalist specializing in international affairs.
