NYN | News
In a notable admission revealing the depth of the predicament facing the coalition camp in Yemen, former British ambassador to several countries, Edmund Brown, acknowledged that Saudi Arabia has come to recognize the clear failure of the Aden-based government forces and the factions aligned with the Presidential Leadership Council in confronting the forces of the Sana’a government—due to what he described as the latter’s military superiority, to the extent that any action against it has become impossible without direct external military intervention.
Brown’s remarks came during a televised interview with Al-Hadath, reflecting a realistic Western reading of the course of the war and showing that the gamble on local forces opposed to Sana’a has failed to achieve its objectives despite years of political and military backing.
Sana’a Government’s (Houthis) Superiority Imposes New Equations
The former British ambassador stated clearly that “undertaking any action against the forces of the Sana’a government without military intervention from Saudi Arabia and the coalition will not be easy,” affirming that Sana’a forces now possess military capabilities that leave their opponents suffering from the same incapacity they have experienced over the past seven years, since the 2018 Stockholm Agreement.
This characterization—coming from a seasoned Western diplomat—reflects a shift in the previously unspoken narrative: the issue is no longer a lack of support or time, but the very nature of the military power that has taken shape in Sana’a and its ability to endure and develop despite blockade and pressure.
Fears About Geography and Control of the Coast
Brown also addressed the issue of territorial division, acknowledging the absence of any practical, applicable scenario at this stage.
He then highlighted Marib and Taiz as the most sensitive areas in the conflict, as both were part of North Yemen before unification—making the idea of relinquishing them “unacceptable,” according to him, for rivals of the Sana’a government (Houthis).
However, the real concern Brown expressed was maritime: he argued that Sana’a’s control over large areas of northern Yemen effectively means control over the Red Sea coast, including the port of Hodeidah and nearby ports—giving it, in his words, the ability to influence shipping whenever it chooses.
This view reflects a growing Western understanding that the power built by the Sana’a government is no longer confined to land but has extended to maritime dynamics—explaining the intense U.S. and Western mobilization in the Red Sea in recent months.
A Call to Reassemble the Coalition… and the Ghost of 2018
In an attempt to revive a previously failed path, Brown called for direct U.S. intervention to rebuild coalition cohesion, ensure full Saudi–UAE coordination, and return to what he described as “the solution that existed before the Stockholm Agreement,” when Saudi-led coalition forces were close to capturing the port of Hodeidah.
However, this call implicitly acknowledges that such an option is no longer easily available, and that the post-2018 balance of power no longer allows turning back the clock—especially given the military experience and deterrence capabilities Sana’a has accumulated.
“Legitimacy” in Crisis… External Support Cannot Decide the Battle
Regarding the ability of the United States to support the so-called “legitimate government,” the former ambassador admitted that the issue “is not easy,” noting that the crisis has persisted for more than a decade and grown more complicated over the past seven years.
He pointed to ongoing forms of Western support—such as British cooperation with the coast guard—while stressing the need for “greater engagement.”
This stance reflects a clear predicament: external support, no matter how extensive, has so far failed to break Sana’a’s military equation.
This explains the shift in Western discourse from talk of “decisive victory” to seeking ways to “manage the conflict” and contain its consequences.
International Confusion… and the Rise of a New Reality
Brown also did not hide the international community’s confusion, saying that its vision for Yemen is “unclear,” while downplaying the role of the United Nations. He emphasized instead that U.S. leadership has become—based on his view—the only factor capable of reuniting the coalition, as seen in other geopolitical files.
However, these remarks simultaneously reveal that a new reality has imposed itself on the ground—one no longer measured by the size of alliances or foreign support but by the ability of local forces to endure and impose their own equations.
Ultimately, for a former British ambassador to speak so openly about the failure of Saudi Arabia’s allies and the difficulty of confronting Sana’a without direct external intervention is not a passing opinion.
It is an indication of a belated acknowledgment that the war in Yemen has produced a power that cannot be bypassed through rhetoric or by simply waiting—and that the balance of power that has emerged now imposes itself even in Western capitals.
