Hadramawt on a Hot Plate: The Power Struggle Opens the Door to Possible Houthi Expansion Clashes Among Coalition-Aligned Factions Reshuffle Calculations and Threat Strategic Balance in Ma’rib

NYN | Reports and Analyses 

A detailed report published by Al-Majalla magazine states that the Houthi movement appears—from a realistic medium- and long-term perspective—to be the primary beneficiary of the ongoing power struggle and the mix of local and regional interests unfolding in Hadramawt, in a scenario open to unpredictable outcomes.

The report warns that the accelerating divisions among coalition-aligned factions may give the Houthis an opportunity to exploit this turmoil and push toward the strategic city of Ma’rib, rich in oil and gas and home to nearly three million residents and displaced persons. The city’s fronts are held by the Third Military Region forces along with tribal “mataareh” positions.

Nevertheless, analysts believe the Houthis are unlikely to rush recklessly toward Ma’rib at this time, even though—according to the report—the group shows little sensitivity to the cost of military operations and has been conducting extensive movements and new deployments on the fronts of Taiz, Lahj, al-Bayda, and Ma’rib for weeks.

Betting on a Saudi Role to Contain the Situation

Several observers say the greatest hope today lies in Saudi Arabia—as leader of the coalition and main sponsor of its component factions—to halt the escalating tensions in Hadramawt and prevent their spillover into Ma’rib, the last major stronghold of the Islah Party.

What Happened in Hadramawt?

At first glance, the events appeared to be a show of force among rival factions within the coalition-backed government. However, later developments revealed that the goal of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and the powers backing it, was not merely to seize Hadramawt’s oil, but to dismantle the presence of the First Military Region, an institution linked to the coalition-backed government and closely aligned with the Islah Party.

In this sense, the operation seemed aimed at imposing a new reality that revives the outlines of the former southern state (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), more than three decades after unification with the north in 1990.

Under sudden and large-scale military pressure—with hints of undisclosed Saudi directives—the First Military Region forces were compelled to withdraw in a disorganized manner without notable resistance, redeploying some of their units to distant areas, possibly toward Ma’rib.

Direct Saudi Oversight

Following the escalation, Saudi Arabia dispatched a high-ranking security delegation to Mukalla, led by Major General Mohammed bin ‘Ubayd al-Qahtani, head of the “Special Committee,” who appeared to be orchestrating the entire process in coordination with both the advancing and withdrawing sides.

Despite the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance complying with de-escalation measures and withdrawing its forces following Saudi orders, STC forces continued their advance beyond Hadramawt into al-Mahra Governorate, removing Yemeni flags and raising the flag of the former southern state on the Yemeni side of border crossings with Oman.

Al-Alimi Summoned and the Loss of Control

Riyadh summoned Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashad al-Alimi from Aden after his office at Ma’ashiq Palace was emptied and its contents destroyed, and the premises handed over to “Storm Forces,” an STC-affiliated unit.

The report notes that Al-Alimi failed to manage the competing factions within the council, resulting in disappointing performance and exposing him to accusations—including charges tantamount to “high treason”—and calls for his trial for causing the fragmentation of the country and worsening its situation.

The Rival Factions Within the Coalition Camp

Forces created by Saudi Arabia—both tribal (the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance) and military (the Nation’s Shield Forces)—entered the confrontation as new players in the balance of power. Yet, according to the report, they were fully neutralized with a single phone call from Riyadh.

The most influential force remains the UAE-backed armed militias of the Southern Transitional Council, in addition to Tariq Saleh’s forces, which have not been deployed yet but—according to the report—seem to be prepared for future battles, foremost among them the Battle of Ma’rib.

In contrast, the First and Second Military Regions, affiliated with the Islah Party, emerged as the biggest losers, having lost their traditional influence in Hadramawt.

How Is the Situation Described?

STC spokesman Mansour Saleh says STC forces are advancing toward Seiyun “in an organized manner and under coalition supervision,” with the aim of “purging Hadramawt of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda.”

But the head of the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance, Amr bin Habrish Al-‘Alīy, who appeared to have been drawn into the forefront only to be abandoned later, said that what is happening is an external tribal invasion by thousands of fighters coming from al-Dhalea and Yafa‘, accompanied by the takeover of camps, oil sites, and the Dabba port.