Yemen’s Legitimacy: From Representing the State to Representing Non-Statehood — A Reading into the Crisis of Structural Disintegration and State Collapse

NYN | Articles 

By Dr. Jamal Al-Hashemi

Yemen is suffering from the crisis of state existence, yet the deeper crisis lies in the presence of a fragmented leadership—comprising seven heads—referred to as the “legitimate authority,” which lacks any real presence on the ground, enjoys no popular support, and holds no effective international standing beyond media coverage and rhetorical speeches.

This “legitimacy,” as a fragile entity, does not represent a functioning state, lacks a national project, and has neither elite nor public consensus. It is an empty structure that has transitioned from a representative framework into a tool of foreign political utility employed within shifting regional balances.

The structural flaw within this legitimacy is not incidental; rather, it is a natural consequence of the disconnection between authority and institution, between legal form and sovereign substance. It bears no relation to the concept of legitimacy in its democratic, civic, historical, or Yemeni-specific sense—except through international recognition, granted on purely political grounds, devoid of international or local standards.

This absence of standards undermines the legitimacy of the “legitimacy” when viewed under international law. We are preparing an international legal case to challenge both the so-called legitimate authority, the de facto authority in Sanaa, and the separatist legitimacy in the south—any form of legitimacy that contradicts the principles of international law. This will be done in coordination with the people and under their mandate.

If we assess the position of the legitimate government in relation to reality, we find it incapable of monopolizing decision-making or asserting sovereignty or reconciliation—grounds sufficient to revoke its legitimacy under international law. If it is unwilling to rebuild a central authority, preferring to remain in the margins where it can survive, then this entitles us to pursue international legal action and file cases in international courts.

Herein lies a double crisis: the politicization of legitimacy and its assumption of responsibility for the people despite being utterly incapable. We are faced with a power structure that has no interest in governance, aware of the costs it would incur, and on another level, is intellectually, functionally, culturally, internationally, and civically unqualified. It merely seeks to maintain the current state of disorder to ensure its survival—even if that means presiding over a stateless void.

This legitimacy does not understand the meaning of responsibility. It only holds the title of “authority” by virtue of international support, without merit, adorned by international conventions that do not align with the nature of a rentier state that has made no effort to reform its governance model. How can such a title be applied to an entity that is disconnected from the concept of statehood—internally, diplomatically, and in its negligible international presence?

In fact, this legitimacy has become a burden on the international community and its Gulf backers. The financial aid and loans it receives will ultimately be paid by future generations, and Yemen’s future will bear the cost of its failure to manage institutions, national resources, and regional and international loans.

It is a legitimacy dependent on citizens for tax revenues and remittances, on community initiatives to build infrastructure and pave roads, and on charity funds and humanitarian aid rather than development funds.

This legitimacy has no development projects nor even the ability to manage humanitarian aid—evident in the president’s proud announcement of providing 100,000 meals of fava beans to poor families, an amount that cannot even compete with a local bakery serving the same quantity to support the poor.

From a nutritional standpoint, these meals do not meet global health and nutrition standards.

Granting more time to this legitimacy reflects a public consciousness crisis and an elite leadership failure. Today’s legitimacy acts as a fragile umbrella under which contradictory forces gather—lacking a unifying project or political identity. Diversity, which should be a source of strength, has turned into organized chaos, where separatist agendas coexist with regional interests, tribal alliances, and sectarian tendencies—within a framework devoid of order, direction, statehood, civility, or any humanistic or visionary project.

This dysfunctional pluralism has produced a patchwork of temporary alliances, soft coups, and interest-based understandings, rendering political decisions incoherent, the executive authority paralyzed, and legitimacy unable to control even its immediate surroundings. In other words, this legitimacy can no longer represent the national whole; it thrives on division.

The problem is not the government per se, but rather the authority itself—formed of seven conflicting heads. Even replacing one hundred cabinets will not enable it to build a semi-state. These replacements are merely a form of political anesthesia—a traditional tactic that no longer works. When the anti-legitimacy revolution erupted in Taiz, a prime minister was appointed from there. When protests flared in Aden, the leadership shifted the government there. When Hadramaut rose, the government was reshuffled again to include a local figure. This constant reshuffling exposes the weakness, ineffectiveness, and incompetence of the leadership in managing the state both domestically and internationally.

The most dangerous threat to any political system is its inability to produce a project or strategies that ensure its continuity. Upon reviewing the actions, speeches, and decisions of Yemen’s current legitimate leadership, it becomes clear that it lacks a national narrative, a clear vision for the future, a unifying public discourse, or a defined identity for the state or its relationship with the region and the world.

This absence of capacity has fragmented the political discourse, reducing it to external slogans and a reliance on formal legitimacy without actual sovereignty. Instead of creating national figures capable of mobilizing and structuring the public, legitimacy has become a sluggish administrative apparatus trailing behind events rather than shaping them.

The result of this fragility, structural disintegration, intellectual emptiness, and dysfunctional pluralism is the transformation of Yemen from a state into a patchwork of competing powers. Each region is under the control of a different force, each funded by a separate sponsor, each with an agenda disconnected from Yemen’s future.

This condition has revived the model of the non-state, where central authority is absent, institutions are ineffective, and sovereignty becomes a tradable commodity at the hands of international players. In this context, legitimacy is no longer part of the solution—it has become one of the main sources of complication due to its incompetence, dependency, and eroded real legitimacy.

The crisis of Yemen’s legitimate structures cannot be resolved through traditional tools, recycling, or even preservation. It suffers from a foundational crisis that reveals the deep disconnect between form and substance, between power and identity, between project and state. Unless this structure is dismantled and re-engineered on the basis of national sovereignty, participation, and a strategic regional vision within the Arabian Peninsula framework, Yemen is likely to face further fragmentation and prolonged statelessness—remaining merely a file in a regional crisis, not a sovereign state.

From this standpoint, we call on the Yemeni people to unite around a new administrative strategy—one that can be established and rooted to move from chaos and disintegration toward a strong, effective state within the framework of regional strategy, Arab identity, and civilizational depth.